The first part of the paper critically reviews some of the uses of the concept of culture in explaining Arab politics. Rather than rejecting the explanatory value of culture in the study of politics, I draw upon a sociological conception of culture that avoids the problems of essentialization associated with previous usages of the term. I then combine concepts from the writings of Antonio Gramsci and postcolonial theorists, such as Edward Said, to explore the links between culture and politics-in particular, the way in which political power is operationalized through cultural processes and the role of civil society in reproducing or challenging culture. The second part applies this framework to a case study of the events surrounding an Egyptian human rights report about police brutality to illustrate how the process of national identity and culture formation undermines democratization. 4 Finally, I draw together the main arguments and their implications for understanding democratization in the conclusion. Not only is this approach questionable in terms of its static conceptualization of culture, but also because of its lack of empirical vigor. Rather than deriving Arab attitudes to politics from the study of current politics and society, writers have claimed that it is possible to know Arab political culture from 4 That is, the aim of the article is to produce a case study of the events surrounding the report of events in al-Kushah and not to present a case study of the actual events that occurred in al-Kushah. readings of religious texts and Arab history. A relationship of causation is established (that is, the lack of democracy is explained by the existence of Arab/Islamic culture) without presenting any evidence to demonstrate such a link. As Lisa Anderson argues, it is equally possible that the lack of democracy is caused by low economic development rates or the absence of full national sovereignty, yet this is never argued by those who promote a political culture approach. 7 Moreover, even a cursory study of politics within Arab/Islamic countries demonstrates the degree of conflict within these societies over such issues as human rights, the role of women in the public sphere and the nature of citizenship. Rather than being culturally homogenous blocs of opposition to so-called Western values, Arab/Islamic countries contain a variety of individuals and groups who are actively involved in promoting democracy and human rights (as the case study below will demonstrate).
Identity, culture and politics
Outside of Middle East politics, the political culture concept has also been subject to criticisms. The predominant approach is encapsulated by Almond and Verba's work on 'civic culture,' in which they argue that democracy is the outcome of citizens possessing the right mix of attitudes towards the political system. 8 More recently, Putnam's work on social capital has argued that democracy is rooted in the level of associational life and existence of norms of trust and cooperation. A decline in these factors has led to a decline in the quality of democracy in the United States. 9 These conclusions are based on the findings of survey data of individuals' attitudes towards the political system and empirical observation of the number of people joining associations.
Such an approach is more rigorous than the methods used by writers within the orientalist tradition.
However, the establishment of a correlation between certain cultural attributes and habits, on the one hand, and democracy on the other, does not establish a relationship of causation. It is possible that people's attitudes could be a product of the nature of the political system, rather than shaping it.
Given these problems, in what way can a study of culture, as opposed to a study of political economy or political institutions, contribute to our understanding of politics and, in particular, democratization?
What is the case for 'bringing it back in'? 10 I argue that political scientists cannot ignore culture- Cultural identity … is a matter of 'becoming' as well as 'being'. … Far from being eternally fixed in some essentialised past, they
[identities] are subject to the continuous 'play' of history, culture and power … identities are the names we give to the different ways we are positioned by, and position ourselves within, the narratives of the past. 16 Culture and identity represent important concepts within the study of political science because they influence how individuals and groups engage with the world-including the world of politics. The processes of cultural construction and identification "bridge agency and structure, are multiple and sometimes contradictory, and can be understood as strategies". 17 Identities-whether based on class, gender, religion, nationality or some other social/cultural marker-play a role in building social movements and 'framing contention'. 18 Moreover, the realm of culture and identity is often the object of contestation for social movements. For example, one of the distinguishing features of the political Islamist movements in the Arab world is their emphasis on promoting an 'Islamic culture.' 19 In Egypt,
Islamist activists have imposed gender segregation and censorship on university campuses, burnt video rental shops and undertook the policing of wedding parties to prevent the consumption of alcohol.
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They have also mobilized street protests against cultural productions that they deem heretical. 21 Conversely, the Egyptian state has also attempted to counter Islamist opposition through producing its own version of Islamic culture, through magazines, newspapers and television programs. 22 The importance of dominating the cultural sphere in order to exercise political power may be signaled by the huge amount of resources dedicated to promoting the leadership cult of the former Syrian President
Hafiz al-Asad. Wedeen argues that the state's promotion of this cult is essential in producing political compliance amongst citizens.
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Culture is not only a resource in the process of identification but also one of the means of structuring the social relationships that underpin hierarchies of power-between state and civil society, men and women, different classes and other social groups. These hierarchies of power provide the infrastructure for maintaining authoritarianism and preventing democratization. The role of culture in structuring politics is theorized by Antonio Gramsci. For Gramsci, the dominant class exercise power not only through mechanisms of coercion, such as the police, military and the legal system, but also through winning consent by a variety of non-coercive means, including political, economic/material and cultural. 24 The exercise of power through consent backed by coercion is termed 'hegemony'. Consent is diffused through civil society-that is, "the ensemble of organisms commonly called 'private'," 25 such as, religion, trade unions and the education system. 26 Civil society, as both institutions and an arena of moral and cultural production, play a role in reproducing and maintaining hegemony. Civil society represents the 'trench systems' of the state-the terrain upon which the battle for hearts and minds is conducted.
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In order to be successful, hegemony must appear to be in the interests of the majority of society and not only in those of the dominant class. 28 A widespread belief in the validity of the existing hegemony is essential because it relies on the participation of ordinary people in its continued reproduction. Like culture and identity, hegemony represents an historical process: "It has continually to be renewed, recreated, defended, and altered, challenged by pressures not at all its own". citizens within a territorially-bound political community and to win consent for their political leadership. The discourse of nationalism is constituted through the construction of an identity and culture that is exclusive and different from those of other nations. However, this is not a top-down project for it relies on citizens of the nation-state to actively participate in the reproduction of national traditions, the telling of national history, the performance of national rituals, the celebration of national heroes, and the commemoration of national anniversaries. 30 These practices represent a means of 'imagining the nation' as a unified, political community but also constitute some of the ways by which civil society contributes to the maintenance of hegemony.
Culture is not only a means of legitimizing the political status quo but also of challenging it. Bhahba argues that the 'performative' process of national culture gives space to those at the margins of the nation, such as women, workers and ethnic/religious minorities, to intervene in the reproduction of the dominant culture and to challenge it with their own 'narratives.' 31 For Gramsci, civil society is not only the terrain upon which the dominant class secures consent for its rule. It is also the sphere in which dominated social groups may organize their opposition and construct an alternative (or 'counter') hegemony. 32 The importance of engaging in the realm of culture as a means of challenging the dominant political order has been understood by diverse social movements throughout history. As noted above, the Islamist movement in Egypt is active in attempting to shape cultural practices. In the 1960s and 1970s, the student movement and youth counter-cultures, such as the hippies, represented dissent from the political and cultural institutions of Western European and North American societies.
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The nature of hegemony-the type of mechanisms of consent and coercion employed-is determined by the economic, social and cultural environment within which it is produced. For Egypt and other countries once colonized, the postcolonial experience represents a significant historical moment shaping the production and reproduction of hegemony in the post-independence period. The 'postcolonial' is a highly contested term. 34 However, here I use it to signify "the spaces where many men and women have to intervene in structures worked through by colonialism, as well as earlier and Egypt today and they still engage in debates that seek to define Egyptian culture and identity. 42 Yet, the construction of essentialized, cultural differences between the colonizers and the colonized was and remains central to the logic of identity construction in relation to all these different trends.
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In addition to sharing common themes, the discourses of these various movements may be considered similar in their aims in that they represented a strategy, employed by other politically marginalized peoples, of challenging the hegemonic cultural representations through the construction of a 'countercultural' discourse, as a means to "transmute marginality into identity." 44 In so doing, "The constructed . 49 The concept of rights used here refers to basic human rights contained within the Universal Declaration, such as, freedom from torture or cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment; freedom from discrimination based on gender, religion or any other social marker; freedom of association; and freedom of speech.
influence. This was far from academic since it actually led to-or at least provided a justification for- 55 The refrain often repeated is that
Copts are 'an integral part of the national fabric.'
The EOHR's report did not intend to address the question of the position of Copts within Egypt. Its objective was to report the degree of police brutality. However, it did mention that the police, not wanting to blame the murder of the two Coptic men on Muslims, because of the dangers of creating a picture of sectarian hatred or the continuing existence of Islamist extremists, decided that they had to pin the crime on a Copt. 56 This admission would later be used to condemn the EOHR for encouraging foreign interference in domestic affairs by providing information that could be used to condemn Egypt for discrimination against Copts.
As with all reports, the EOHR distributed copies to its established mailing list-the local and international press, local and international organizations and the Egyptian government. It also filed complaints with the public prosecutor. However, no response was forthcoming from the authorities and the only local press to report the case was al-Ahali (the weekly newspaper of the leftist Tagammu' party) and al-Watani (the only newspaper published by and for Copts).
It is significant that the case did not become an issue of national public debate until several weeks later when the British newspaper, The Sunday Telegraph, picked up the story on October 25, 1998. The headline read: "Egyptian police 'crucify' and rape Christians-thousands of Copts in Egypt have been nailed to the doors of their homes, beaten and tortured as authorities crack down on non-Muslims".
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The article was grossly exaggerated, bore little resemblance to the EOHR report and was based on sources that were not verified. Undoubtedly, prejudices about the 'Orient' among newspaper staff allowed such a story to be printed without the reporter having set foot in Egypt to verify the facts.
The article triggered an angry response from the Egyptian national press, politicians and many 63 In other words, cultural processes associated with globalization were perceived to be threatening Egyptian national sovereignty.
The media attention on the al-Kushah affair caused sufficient domestic embarrassment for the government to intervene directly in an attempt to discredit the EOHR and undermine its claims by orchestrating an event that would divert attention away from the question of what actually happened in al-Kushah. On November 4 and 5, the three major quasi-governmental daily newspapers (alGumhuriya, al-Ahram and al-Akhbar) all ran stories of how the Suhag branch of the EOHR had resigned over the EOHR report of the events in al-Kushah, describing it as biased and full of lies. The resigning members criticized the EOHR head office for not seeking the input of the Suhag branch in compiling the report and for using impartial sources. 64 The stakes against the EOHR were raised even higher when quasi-governmental daily al-Misa' of 6
November ran a front-page story on the resignations with new reasons: that "the EOHR head office is working for the West," that "a foreign correspondent had secretly accompanied the fact-finding mission," and that "the mission met with terrorists." The allegations of foreign and terrorist links were meant to immediately discredit the EOHR and characterize its report as being directed against Egypt's interests. The ex-Suhag branch members "opposed the report, which is being used to attack national security," and accused the EOHR head office of being "unpatriotic." They planned to establish an alternative human rights group that "would rely on national and not foreign funding Reinforcing the campaign to discredit the EOHR report, Mustafa Bakri, publisher of the independent weekly newspaper al-Usbu' and his brother Mahmud Bakri resigned from the EOHR, "in protest of the lies published by the EOHR, claiming that Copts in al-Kushah were severely tortured, which has harmed Egypt and its reputation abroad." 72 Mustafa Bakri had previously been an elected member of the EOHR board.
The stakes against the EOHR were further raised on November 23, when al-Usbu' printed on its first page a picture of a check made out to the EOHR for $25,000 from the British embassy and above it was written: "The Price interests. al-Usbu' is presenting these facts to the public prosecutor to defend the nation's security, which we cannot allow to be subject to the games of a handful of collaborators with the West and their intelligence agencies.
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The quasi-governmental press quickly picked up on al-Usbu''s story, publishing the news of Mustafa
Bakri's statements to the public prosecutor on their crime pages.
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The whole affair shocked the EOHR board, which convened an emergency meeting to discuss the issue, following which, a statement was issued in which it was asserted that there was no link between the British embassy check and the al-Kushah report. The money was the second installment toward a legal aid project for women and people with disabilities. The board decided to return the British embassy check, to stop accepting funds from any foreign government or embassy and to review the acceptance of funds from any other foreign organization in future. This story was widely published in the Egyptian national press. 75 The actions of the EOHR board in returning the check and refusing future funding from foreign governmental bodies only helped to provide ammunition to attack the EOHR further. In an interview with the English language weekly the Cairo Times, Bakri claimed that the fact that the EOHR board had returned the check was proof of a connection between the check and the al-Kushah report.
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The following days witnessed a media focus on the issue of foreign funding of the EOHR to the exclusion of any discussion about the events in al-Kushah. 77 Some of the articles were sympathetic to 73 Ibid, p. the EOHR (al-Wafd, al-Hayat) and some used the issue of foreign funding to attack the EOHR (alUsbu'), however, all articles had accepted the parameters of the debate as those of 'national security'
and 'national interests'. It was no longer important whether Egyptian citizens had been tortured by the police. What was important was whether Egypt's 'national security' had in any way been compromised by the EOHR.
The general consensus constructed through the press over the accusations targeted at the EOHR created a suitable climate for the public prosecutor to investigate the accusations made by Mustafa Bakri and arrest EOHR Secretary General Hafiz Abu Sa'da (on December 1). The official investigation was incorporated into, and became an extension of the process of the political 'Othering' of human rights
NGOs. The investigations into the check and its link to al-Kushah were extensively leaked to the press with the effect that Abu Sa'da was proclaimed guilty by many without even being formally charged.
The accusations made by the prosecutor included: "accepting bribes from a foreign country with the aim of harming the national interest and spreading false allegations and rumors in order to disturb public security and peace" and "receiving donations without a license." 78 In addition, press reports, particularly in the government press, implied financial corruption by referring to the relatively large sums of money received by the EOHR. 79 The political party opposition press did little to defend Abu Sa'da against these accusations (although some individual writers wrote in defense of the EOHR).
In response to Abu Sa'da's arrest, eight other Egyptian human rights organizations held a press conference in which they condemned the "political campaign against the human rights movement under the cloak of a legal case." 80 The EOHR board took the symbolic decision of freezing the organization's activities to protest the anti-democratic atmosphere that made it impossible for the EOHR to conduct its work. 81 The British embassy issued a public statement denying that the check was in any way linked to the al-Kushah report and asserting that it was intended for a legal aid project. 82 The arrest of Abu Sa'da also met with a strong campaign by international human rights organizations calling for his release. 
Conclusion
The reactions to the EOHR report on the incidents in al-Kushah illustrate the political effects of the struggle over the reproduction of national identity. This contestation occurred principally within civil society, via the media. The allegations of police brutality in al-Kushah were glossed over with slogans of 'national unity' and transformed into a debate about the threat of human rights NGOs to the nation.
The government and some elements of civil society sought to discredit the report, the EOHR and human rights NGOs in general because of their links with organizations in the West, particularly through their receiving of grants from these organizations. In order to protect the nation from Western intervention in domestic affairs and guard Egyptian national sovereignty, it was deemed justifiable to harass human rights activists on the basis of their links with the West. In this way, contestations over Egyptian national identity resulted in the further narrowing of the public space available for independent political action and criticism of the government. 9, 304 words.
